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PENNSYLVANIA CHATTEL SECURITY AND THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
By MARVIN SCHWARTZ '1
The Pennsylvania lawyer who looks at secured commercial trans-
actions in the light of Article 8 of the proposed Uniform Commercial
Code may well feel that he is really seeing them for the first time.
Business mn have for centuries relied upon security interests to pro-
tect extensions of credit, but lawyers have become accustomed to think-
ing of these transactions in terms of bailment, chattel mortgage, trust
receipt, etc., because under the law of Pennsylvania as it is today, a
secured transaction has no legal existence except insofar as it is capable
of being fitted into one of the legally recognized forms. Under the
Code, businessmen will continue to extend credit on the strength of
security interests and in almost every case will be no more or no less
secure than they were before. But lawyers will no longer have to
squeeze transactions shaped by the twentieth century business needs
of their clients into a form that was cast to satisfy the requirements
of a bygone age. The end result will, in most cases, be the same under
the Code as it was before, but it will be easier and therefore cheaper
to get there.
By way of introduction, this paper will attempt to evaluate the
impact of the Code upon secured transactions in Pennsylvania. It
will, therefore, be principally concerned with Article 8 of the Code, en-
titled "Secured Transactions." The Code, as revised to October, 1949,
contains nine Articles in all,' and it is that draft which will be discussed
here. Some changes will be made, however, at the joint meeting in
May, 1950, of the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.2 It is expected that the
Code will be presented to the 1951 session of the General Assembly.
Article 8 itself is divided into five parts: applicability and defini-
tions; validity of a security agreement and the rights of the parties
t LL. B., 1949, University of Pennsylvania; Member of the Philadelphia Bar.
1. Article 1, General Provisions; Article 2, Sales; Article 3, Commercial Paper;
Article 4, Letters of Credit; Article 5, Foreign Banking; Article 6, Documents of
Title; Article 7, Investment Securities; Article 8, Secured Transactions; Article 9,
Bulk Sales. The article on bulk sales is substantially the same, except for marked
improvements in language and form, as the Pennsylvania Bulk Sales Law, PA. STAT.
A x., tit. 69, §§ 521-529 (Purdon, 1931; Cur. Supp. 1948); Pa. Laws 1919, No.
141, pp. 262-265, as amended to date by Pa. Laws 1939, No. 97, pp. 189-190.
2. For the history of Uniform Commercial Code, see Beers, The New Com-
mercial Code, 2 Bus. LAW 14 (1947) ; Goodrich, Moder; Law for Mode"; Business,
49 Com. LJ. 148 (1944), Nation's Business, March, 1944, p. 23; Ireton, The Proposed
Commercial Code: A New Deal in Chattel Security, 43 ILL. L. REv. 794 (1949).
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thereto; rights of purchasers from and creditors of the debtor; for-
malities of filing; and rights on default. It would supplant and require
the repeal of six Pennsylvania statutes of general applicability 3 and
would make it advisable to amend three others.'
Whether a secured transaction takes the form, for instance of a
bailment lease or a chattel mortgage should be of no significance un-
der the Code. What will be significant is whether the goods involved
are consumer goods, inventory or equipment. 5 To illustrate, the re-
tailer who sells a refrigerator on credit under present law may protect
his interest by employing a bailment lease, a conditional sale contract
or a chattel mortgagea He must make a perfect choice, and at his
3. Act of June 28, 1947 (bailment leases), PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§ 511-514
(Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948) ; Pa. Laws 1947, No. 478, pp. 1141-1142.
FACTOR'S LIEN ACT, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, §§ 221-229 (Purdon, Cum. Supp.
1948) ; Pa. Laws 1947, No. 241, pp. 529-533.
Act of June 1, 1945 (chattel mortgages), PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940; Pa. Laws
1945, No. 434, pp. 1358-1366, as amended to date by Pa. Laws 1947, No. 461, pp. 1070-
1071; Pa. Laws 1947, No. 110, pp. 270-272.
Act of July 31, 1941 (transfer of accounts receivable), PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69,
§8 561-563 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948) ; Pa. Laws 1941, No. 255, pp. 606-607.
UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, §§ 551-570 (Purdon, Cum.
Supp. 1948) ; Pa. Laws 1941, No. 138, pp. 307-317. ..
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§ 361-504 (Purdon,
1931, Cum. Supp 1948) ; Pa. Laws 1925, No. 325, pp. 603-612, as amended to date by
Pa. Laws 1935, No. 239, pp. 658-660; Pa. Laws 1939, No. 37, pp. 43-44; Pa. Laws
1943, No. 174, p. 373; Pa. Laws 1947, No. 477, pp. 1140-1141; Pa. Laws 1949, No. 109.
Statutes applicable to special types of collateral:
Act of March 7, 1929 (mortgage of vessels), PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, §§ 921-930
(Purdon, 1930) ; Pa. Laws 1929, No. 12, pp. 14-17.
Act of May 13, 1889 (mortgage of royalties from mineral lands), PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 21, §§ 891-894 (Purdon, 1930) ; Pa. Laws 1889, No. 217, pp. 197-198.
Act of April 28, 1887 (mortgage of enumerated iron and petroleum products),
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, §§ 861-870 (Purdon, 1930) ; Pa. Laws 1887, No. 32, pp. 73-
75, as amended by Pa. Laws 1891, No. 78, p. 102.
4. See text at notes 15, 34, 52, infra.
5. § 8-107. "In this Article goods subject to a security interest are
"(1) 'consumer goods' if they are used for the debtor's personal, family or
household purposes; or if they are goods not otherwise included in the definitions
of inventory, farm products or equipment;
"(2) 'equipment' if used by a debtor in his business or calling or if used in
farming or if used by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a governmental
subdivision or agency. Equipment includes machinery whether or not affixed to
the realty, rolling stock, vehicles and craft but does not include goods which at
the time a security interest attaches are being held or prepared for sale in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business;
"(3) [crops, livestock and farm products] . .;
"(4) 'inventory' if the debtor is a manufacturer, processor, dealer or other
person holding or preparing the goods for sale or furnishing the goods as part of
a contract of services and if the goods are raw materials, materials in course of
manufacture or processing, materials consumed in the business and finished
goods."
Section references in this paper are to the Uniform Commercial Code, unless
otherwise indicated.
5a. It has been suggested that the chattel mortgage statute covers only loans and
not sales transactions. Berger, War Time and Post War Pennsylvania Contracts,
Decisions and Statutes, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 30, 45-47 (1946); Mulder, The Penn-
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peril, for as will be discussed below, a mistaken choice under certain
circumstances may mean the complete loss of his security interest. If
he merely "leases" the refrigerator, there is no requirement that there
be a public record of the transaction.' If the "lease" so provides, he
may repossess upon default and do with the used refrigerator as he
pleases.7 No disposition of the refrigerator by the "lessee" can cut
off the dealer's interest and the dealer is fully protected against cred-
itors.' If, however, the dealer employs the chattel mortgage or con-
ditional sale device to protect his interest, he must file a copy of the
security instrument. The seller is protected against the purchaser's
creditors and subsequent vendees, but if he repossesses he must follow
the rather elaborate procedure ordained by the legislature. The Code,
on the other hand, recognizes what lawyers have known for a long
time: the factual situation remains the same whether the security device
employed is a bailment lease, chattel mortgage or conditional sale.
Therefore, it treats the transaction the same no matter what the parties
choose to call it. In effect it is the Code which makes the choice of
security device, not the lender, and the danger of a mistaken choice
is obviated. If the requirements of all concerned are satisfied by a
bailment lease, for which filing is not required, why require filing for
the same transaction merely because it bears a different label? If the
chattel mortgagor and the conditional vendee must be protected against
harsh repossession practices, why not the lessee under a bailment
lease ?
To take another illustration, the statutory chattel mortgage may
be used in any number of situations. It may protect the retail seller
of a washing machine, the supplier of seed to a farmer, the seller of
industrial or farm equipment, or the lender who finances the acquisi-
sylvania Chattel Mortgage Act, 17 PA. B.A.Q. 242 (1946) ; Note, The Priority Pro-
vision of the Pennsylvania Chattel Mortgage Act, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 396 (1947).
But the language of the statute--"any funds borrowed or to be borrowed"--seems
broad enough to include both types of transactions. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.1
(Purdon, Cune. Supp. 1949). An installment buyer is as much a borrower as the man
who pays cash for the goods and is later given a loan with the goods as collateral.
That the General Assembly thought so is evidenced by the fact that at the session
immediately succeeding enactment of the chattel mortgage statute it defined an in-
stallment sale contract to include one in which a mortgage is executed as security.
MOTOR VEHICLE SALES AcT OF 1947, § 3(10), PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §603(10)
(Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1949).
6. The Pennsylvania version of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act does not
affect bailment leases. Compare § 1 of the Uniform Act with PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69,
§ 361 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948). See Stern & Co. v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. 112
(1929). Whether a court will treat a particular transaction as a bailment is another
matter. The cases are well analyzed by Mars, J. in Commercial Inv. Trust Co. v.
Minon, 104 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1939). See, also, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Hartman, 114 Pa. Super. 544, 174 Atl. 795 (1934).
7. Quinlan & Robertson, Inc. v. Rundle, 273 Pa. 479, 117 AtI. 208 (1922); cf.
Mason & Hamlin Co. v. Devon Manor School, 273 Pa. 398, 117 Atl. 78 (1922).
8. Brown v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 At. 904 (1894) ; Clark v. Jack, 7 Watts
375 (Pa. 1838).
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tion of raw material or inventory by a manufacturer or retailer. But
no matter how used, the same statutory rules are applicable, even
though it cannot be said that these very much different situations raise
the same problems. The Code, however, looks to the realities of a
transaction, and the applicable rules are determined by an appraisal
of those realities rather than by the form of the security device. The
washing machine retailer need not record and may not insist that
the purchaser waive rights growing out of breach of warranty. The
holder of an inventory lien, on the other hand, must file a financing
statement and his right to insist upon a waiver of contract rights is
governed by Article 2 on Sales. It makes no difference under the
Code that both security agreements are labeled "chattel mortgage."
FILING
Changes of little subtlety and immediate impact would be effected
by the Code in the area of filing requirements and filing procedure.'
First of all, security devices arising from purchase money consumer
goods transactions need not be filed at all, nor need there be filing
for farm equipment purchases below a dollar amount to be filled in
by the legislature. The question of whether consumer goods filing is
worth the trouble and expense involved was really answered by the
Pennsylvania courts more than a hundred years ago when they de-
cided that a bailment lease, for which filing is not required, protects
the lender's interest in the collateral against the debtor's creditors.
While this provision may beget controversy in other jurisdictions, 10
it is in reality no innovation for Pennsylvania. The Code merely ex-
tends the bailment lease rule to transactions which could have taken
that form but which for reasons best known to the lender did not.
"Isolated" or "casual" assignments of accounts receivable are
also exempted from the requirement of filing if a significant part of
the assignor's accounts are not transferred. The present practice of
stamping the assignor's books or notifying the account debtor 11 would
no longer be necessary.
For other non-possessory security interests, filing is required, and
the Code adopts the notice filing system of the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act and the Factor's Lien Act. A financing statement is effective for
five years, 12 whereas under existing statutes the duration varies from
9. § 8-303 enumerates the types of transaction for which filing is not required.
Part 4 of Article 8, §§ 8-401 to 8407, provides for the formalities of filing.
10. The question of filing consumer goods transactions is discussed in Gilmore,
Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 783-785 (1948) ; Kripke, The "Secured Trans-
actions" Provesions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. Rnv. 577, 612-613
(1949).
11. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§ 561-562 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
12. § 8-405.
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one to fifteen years, and as is now true of trust receipts, filing will
generally be with the Secretary of State as well as in the county of
the debtor's principal place of business. Farm equipment and farm
product transactions are filed in the county of the debtor's residence,
and when crops are to serve as collateral, the statement must also be
filed with the Recorder of Deeds.
Code Section 8-401 (3) is in accord with the Pennsylvania de-
cisions in providing that a financing statement which has in good
faith been filed in the wrong place is nevertheless effective with regard
to collateral as to which it is properly filed. 3 Section 8-404 provides
that acceptance of the financing statement by the filing officer and pay-
ment of the fee affords complete protection to the lender. Of all the
existing chattel security statutes, only the trust receipts act is so ex-
plicit on the risk of error problem, but the rule adopted is the one
followed by the Pennsylvania courts,14 even in the absence of express
statutory coverage.
A Code provision that may cause difficulty in Pennsylvania is
Section 8-402. It exempts from the Article 8 filing requirements
security interests in goods for which perfection, under some other
statute, requires registration of the lien on a certificate of title. One
such statute may be the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, which provides
that "A certificate of title shall contain . . . a statement of any liens
or encumbrances" and that such notations "shall be adequate notice to
the Commonwealth, creditors or purchasers that a lien.
exists." '"
The problem as it now exists is this: is a duly recorded condi-
tional sale contract for a motor vehicle "perfected" if the vendor has
failed to note his lien on the title certificate? The draftsmen of the
chattel mortgage act recognized the problem and specifically provided
that.a chattel mortgage on a motor vehicle is not perfected unless the
lien is noted on the certificate.' 6 And there is one common pleas de-
cision to the effect that a bailment lease of a motor vehicle is not per-
fected unless noted on the title certificate. If that case was rightly
decided, then a security interest under any existing statute, and there-
fore under the Commercial Code, must be registered on the certificate
if the lender is to be fully protected. This would be so even though
an automobile may be consumer goods for which are exempted from
13. Oberholtzer's Appeal, 124 Pa. 583, 17 Atl. 143 (1889) ; Oberholtzer v. Evans,
134 Pa. 366, 19 Atl. 681 (1890).
14. Glading v. Frick, 88 Pa. 460 (1879) ; Farabee v. McKerrihan, 172 Pa. 234, 33
Atl. 583 (1896).
15. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, § 33 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948) (emphasis added).
16. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.5 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
17. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colborn, 45 Pa. D. & C. 82 (C.P. Lack.
1942).
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filing requirements under Commercial Code Section 8-303. And if
registration on the certificate is "adequate notice to the Commonwealth,
creditors and purchasers that a lien . . . exists," can a seller-lender
safely ignore the provisions of all existing or future chattel security
statutes and do no more than note his lien on the certificate? A plaus-
ible reading of the Vehicle Code is that notation of a lien on the cer-
tificate precludes the status of good faith purchaser or creditor to
those who deal with the debtor. One thing, however, is very clear:
unless the Vehicle Code is clarified, its want of clarity will be carried
over into the Commercial Code. Lenders will be well advised now and
even under the Commercial Code to file their security interests in motor
vehicles with the Secretary of RevenueY
THE SECURITY AGREEMENT
A security agreement under the Code may be drafted so as to
bind the debtor's after-acquired property."8 Indeed, Article 8 "pays
little attention to rights of a borrower or lender between themselves.
With few excelitions complete freedom to contract as to lender's rights
is preserved." ' There are exceptions, however, to the general sanc-
tion given to after-acquired property clauses when the collateral is
crops or consumer goods. The Code follows the chattel mortgage act
in barring liens on crops to be planted more than one year after the
security agreement is made,2" but a tentative provision would permit
after-acquired crop liens during the period of a lease, mortgage or land
purchase contract if the security agreement is executed in conjunction
with the real estate transaction. This tentative provision is by an-
alogy, at least, consistent with the Pennsylvania "industrial mort-
gage" doctrine.2 - The Code's prohibition, of after-acquired property
clauses in consumer goods transactions replaces current provisions that
previously purchased goods may secure subsequent purchases until the
former goods are paid for.22
In the ordinary commercial security transactioi, the Code places
no limitations upon after-acquired property clauses. It is a matter
for the parties to arrange to their own liking, as it is now under the
17a. On the general subject of reconciling the Vehicle Code with chattel security
statutes, see Note, Toward the Standardization of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Liens,
98 U. OF PA. L. REV. 419 (1950).
18. § 8-203.
19. Comment, § 8-101.
20. § 8-203(a) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.1 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
21. See Roos v. Fairy Silk Mills, 334 Pa. 305, 5 A.2d 569 (1939).
22. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.4a (chattel mortgage); tit. 69, § 409 (condi-
tional sale) ; tit. 69, § 511 (bailment lease) (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
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Factor's Lien Act.2" The present chattel mortgage statute, however,
is more restrictive, for the lien of the mortgage can bind only after-
acquired chattels of the same class, replacements and increase and prod-
uce of the collateral. The Code also permits the assignment of ac-
counts receivable that have not yet accrued, with the lender's interest
attaching when the account comes into existence. Before the enact-
ment of the accounts receivable statute, it was held that accounts to
accrue in the future were assignable.2" But under the current statute,
only an "indebtedness" is assignable 24 and although the courts have
not yet spoken, it would seem that there can be no effective assignment
until the assignor ships goods to the obligor and an obligation to pay
for them is thereby created.
Pennsylvania's chattel security statutes make it clear that a secu-
rity interest is not invalidated by the power of the debtor to sell or dis-
pose of the collateral.24a Code Section 8-206 is even more clear in
laying down the same rule and goes one step further by burying the
ghost of Benedict v. Ratner.25 In that case, the United States Su-
preme Court held that a security interest is invalid if the debtor does
not account to the secured lender for the proceeds of sale of inventory
or if the assignor of accounts receivable does not account to the lender
for the collection of assigned accounts. The present assignment statute
is silent in this respect and the question has never been litigated in a
Pennsylvania state court. But there is a federal decision that the Penn-
sylvania rule is in accord with Benedict v. Ratner.2"
When the parties to a transaction are all businessmen, Code Sec-
tion 8-207, by reference to Article 2 on Sales, permits a seller to effec-
tively disclaim express or implied warranties.2 7 In the case of assign-
ments, an account debtor's agreement that he will not assert claims
arising out of his contract with the assignor is enforceable by an
22a. Some difficulty may be attendant upon "floating liens" under the Factor's
Lien Act because of its requirement of "separate statements." PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6,
§ 222 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1949).
23. East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, 91 Pa. 96 (1879).
24. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 561 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
24a. This is not true, however, of the bailment lease, a non-statutory security de-
vice. A bailment lease is ineffective if the goods are intended for consumption or re-
sale. Bowser & Co. v. Franklin Mtge. & Inv. Co., 305 Pa. 459, 158 At. 170 (1931) ;
Hooveler-Stutz Co. v. Cleveland Motor Sales, 92 Pa. Super. 425 (1928) ; cf. Brown
v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 Atl. 904 (1894) (trust receipt; trustee assimilated to
bailee).
25. 168 U.S. 353 (1925).
26. In re Pusey, Maynes, Breish Co., 122 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941).
27. § 2-316:
"(1) If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are
inoperative.
"(2) Exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability
or of fitness for a particular purpose must be in specific language and if the inclu-
sion of such language creates an ambiguity in the contract as a whole it shall be
resolved against the seller; . .
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assignee who takes his assignment for value and in good faith. How-
ever, defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course cannot be effectively waived. These ever-available defenses, as
enumerated in Code Section 3-305, include infancy, incapacity, duress,
illegality, fraud "in fact," and discharge in insolvency proceedings.
But when a consumer comes into the picture, efforts to impart elements
of negotiability to the security agreement are doomed to failure.
Installment retailers will be compelled to abandon their favorite form
of conditional sale contract, under which the vendee purports to promise
not to assert any warranty defenses against an assignee. Although
such contracts have long been in vogue, their effectiveness has not
been passed upon by the Pennsylvania courts. In other jurisdictions,
lenders have not fared too well with them,"8 so it may be that Code
Section 8-207 (3) does not in fact remove a weapon of any signifi-
cance from the secured lender's armory. The Code also closes a side
door to quasi-negotiability by invalidating negotiable notes which the
consumer may execute as part of the security transaction. Heretofore,
the side door was more than slightly ajar in Pennsylvania, for in
Welton v. Littlejohn the Supreme Court held that a note imparted its
negotiability to a contemporaneously executed real estate mortgage,
cutting off the debtor's defenses on the mortgage as well as on the
note.2" The door has already been closed by the General Assembly
as to motor vehicle security transactions, for a provision similar to
Code Section 8-207 (3) is found in the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act of 1947."a
SECURED LENDER V. CREDITORS AND PURCHASERS
As under current statutes, the secured lender who has not per-
fected his security interest by filing, when filing is necessary, is pro-
tected against the lender's creditors and purchasers only to the ex-
tent that they gave value or procured their liens with knowledge of
the lender's interest.30 But even a perfected security interest is sub-
ject to defeat by buyers in the ordinary course of the debtor's trade
when the debtor has been authorized by the security agreement to
dispose of the collateral, which must be the case when the collateral
is inventory. A perfected security interest in "chattel paper" 3' may
also be defeated by a good faith assignee for value if the whole transac-
28. See Note, 57 YALE LJ. 1414 (1948).
29. 163 Pa. 206, 29 Atl. 871 (1894) ; cf. Levy v. Gilligan, 244 Pa. 272, 90 Atl. 647
(1914).
29a. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 615 (G) (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1949).
30. § 8-301.
31. § 8-106(4) : "'Chattel paper' means a writing which evidences a security inter-
est in or a lease of goods, and which contains or secures a right to the payment of
money, if the writing is of the type whose transfer customarily requires delivery... .
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tion is in the ordinary course of business,3la as is true under the Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act.
A security interest in after-acquired property-even though per-
fected-may be defeated by the holder of a subsequent purchase money
security interest.32 Although this particular provision is new, the prin-
ciple that purchase money obligations are to be accorded special treat-
ment is by no means novel in Pennsylvania. Purchase money real
estate mortgages, for example, are given precedence by statute.' 3 To
merit special treatment under the Code, the purchase money lender
must perfect his interest within ten days after the debtor receives the
collateral, and if the collateral is inventory, the first lender must be
given a detailed notice.
The question of whether goods in which the lender has a security
interest have become fixtures is left by Code Section 8-112 to "other
rules of law." But even if the collateral is a fixture under the Penn-
sylvania decisions, the secured lender's interest prevails over those of
the realty owner or encumbrancer if he files with the Recorder of
Deeds in addition to conforming with the general filing requirements
of Article 8. The lender who has filed his interest with the custodian
of the realty records may remove the collateral after default no matter
how much it has become a part of the real estate. But he must reim-
burse the realty owner for physical damage caused by the removal.
The rules laid down as to fixtures by current statutes are hardly
changed at all, but the provision for filing security interests in fixtures
with the realty records is new and quite sound. One provision of
the conditional sales statute would seem worth adding to the Code.
It permits the lender or realty owner to petition the court of com-
mon pleas for a determination of how great a bond should be posted
to guard the realty owner against removal damages.34 This simple
method of settling such disputes seems preferable to a full-blown law-
suit.
Security interests in accessions to chattels are treated by Code
Section 8-313 much the same as fixtures. A perfected interest in the
part added prevails over a prior perfected interest in the whole. Cur-
rent statutes are silent on the subject of accessions to chattels, but
it has been held that a prior interest in the principal chattel prevails
against an interest in the accession unless the latter can be severed
without detriment to the whole. 5 The difficulty with this disarmingly
31a. § 8-308.
32. § 8-311.
33. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 622 (Purdon, 1930).
34. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 404 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
35. White Co. v. Bowen, 84 Pa. Super. 484 (1925).
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simple rule lies in determining which attachments can be severed with-
out detriment to the principal chattel, and held so severable have been
a truck body from a truck chasis " and motor vehicle tires.37  If the
accessions are severable, it does not seem to matter under the Penn-
sylvania decisions that the instrument retaining title to the whole pur-
ports to cover after-acquired accessories and replacement parts.3"
Common law and statutory liens.-Two disturbing problems are
raised in Pennsylvania by Code Section 8-309, which provides that:
If a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien given by statute or rule of law for such materials
or services takes precedence over the security interest unless a
statute creating the lien provides otherwise.
This section would apparently reverse the order of priority as be-
tween artisan and conditional vendor, for the conditional sales statute
gives precedence to a lien creditor only if his lien arises by "attach-
ment or levy," " and that is not the genesis of an artisan's or carrier's
lien. The same seems to hold true under the Chattel Mortgage Act.
40
Opposite results flow from the language of the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act and the Factor's Lien Act, with the common law or statutory lienor
there prevailing over the secured lender.4 A reversal of priority
is not of too much significance when, as with the conditional sale and
the chattel mortgage, the change affects a clash of interests that does
not frequently occur and when the secured fender's interest depends
upon a chattel security statute of recent date.
It is the bailment lease and the Constitution of 1874 which raise
the first Section 8-309 problem. To begin with, it is settled that a
common law or statutory lien does not accrue to one who renders
services to a bailee; no such lien may be asserted by the artisan or
warehouseman against the bailor.42 The rationale of the leading case
36. White Co. v. Bowen, supra.
37. Goodrich Silvertown, Inc. v. Bryner, 42 Dauph. 267 (C.P. 1936) ; Worthing-
ton v. Jabs, 50 York 101 (C.P. 1936); National Tire & Rubber Co. v. Daley's Blue
Line Trans. Co., 28 Luzerne 6 (C.P. 1933). Cases from other jurisdictions are col-
lected in Lee, Accessories to Automobiles Sold Under Title-Retaining Instruments, 19
TEmPLE L.Q. 89 (1945) ; Note, 92 A.L.R. 425 (1934).
38. Goodrich Silvertown, Inc. v. Bryner, supra; Worthington v. Jabs, supra; Na-
tional Tire & Rubber Co. v. Daley's Blue Line Trans. Co., supra.
39. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 402 (Purdon, 1931).
40. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.5 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
41. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 561 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948) (trust receipt);
tit. 6, § 224 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948) (factor's lien).
42. Estey Co. v. Dick, 41 Pa. Super. 610 (1910) (storage of piano); Stern v.
Sica, 66 Pa. Super. 84 (1917) (automobile mechanic); Bankers' Corn. Sec. Co. v.
Brennan v. Levy, 75 Pa. Super. 199 (1920) (automobile mechanic).
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of Meyers v. Bratespeice is that there can be no lien unless the work
is performed at the request of the person who has "title" to the col-
lateral.43
If under the Code, a lender insists upon the bailment lease device
in, for instance, the credit sale of an automobile and if the bailee-debtor
takes the vehicle to an automobile mechanic for repairs, Section 8-309
would subordinate the interest of the bailor-lender to that of the
mechanic. But the order of liens has always been just the opposite,
and we have the constitutional provision which prohibits special or
local laws providing or changing methods for the collection of debts
and the enforcing of judgments, or authorizing the creation, extension
or impairing of liens. 44 This provision has been interpreted as freez-
ing the law as it existed prior to 1874.4' Held invalid under it has
been a statute giving an attorney a lien upon his client's cause of
action, "an enactment radically different from any law existing before
the date of its passage." '6 Also invalidated was a statute giving to
certain silk processors a lien in the amount of any account due them
upon goods which came into their hands for processing, even if such
account had no relation to the particular goods against which the lien
was asserted.47  On the other hand, more recent decisions have up-
held similar statutes when "a real reason for the preference is made
to appear." 48 "Real" reasons were found for giving priority to bank
depositors in bank liquidation proceedings,49 for subordinating the
interest of a real estate mortgagee to that of a conditional vendor, 0
and for exempting a security interest in an ice cream cabinet from a
landlord's distraint for rent.5 The cases taking the "freeze" point of
view are distinguisable from the others only in result and in language,
but certainly the public policy bases of the common law and statutory
liens should be reason enough for the priority given them by Code
Section 8-309.
The second problem raised by Section 8-309 is of much more
substance and significance to lenders than the first. It involves, first
of all, the question of whether a landlord's distraint for rent would
take precedence over a Code security interest. It has long been the
rule in Pennsylvania that goods held by a tenant under any type of
security arrangement-including a bailment lease-are subject to a
43. 174 Pa. 119, 34 At. 551 (1896).
44. PA. CONsT. ART. 3, § 7.
45. Page v. Carr, 232 Pa. 371, 81 Atl 430 (1911).
46. Laplacca v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 265 Pa. 304, 108 Atl. 612 (1919).
47. Gerli v. Perfect Silk Throwing Co., 70 Pa. Super. 299 (1918).
48. In re Cameron, 287 Pa. 560, 135 Atl. 295 (1926).
49. It re Cameron, supra.
50. Ridgway Dynamo & Engine Co. v. Werder, 287 Pa. 358, 135 AtI. 216 (1926).
51. Rieck-Mcjunkin Dairy Co. v. Sachs Real Estate Co., 102 Pa. Super. 293, 156
Atl. 748 (1931).
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landlord's distraint for rent.52 In view of these cases, it seems prob-
able that a landlord is a person "who in the ordinary course of his
business furnishes services" to goods kept on the rented premises.
If the courts so hold, it will be necessary to reconcile with the Code
a heterodoxy of statutes which exempt from distraint collateral rang-
ing from mel6deons through household goods to dynamos.53 The lan-
guage of these statutory monuments to trade association lobbies is
fully as diverse as the types of goods they exempt, and the prudent
lender must study the applicable one carefully before deciding upon the
form of security device employed. For the story of a lender who
was not so prudent, see Commercial Credit Plan v. Mahoney.54 There,
household goods were sold to a tenant subject to a duly perfected
chattel mortgage, but the exemption statute for household goods pro-
vides that the collateral is not liable to distraint if "leased or hired un-
der bailment lease . . . or conditionally sold." r5 The outcome was
that the secured lender lost out to the landlord. Should this decision
be followed, form might retain importance even under the Commercial
Code. To avoid such an unfortunate result, it is suggested that the
exemption statutes be revised to protect any security interest in the
designated types of collateral.
RIGHTS ON DEFAULT
The rights of a secured lender on default, as indexed by Code
Section 8-501, are roughly equivalent to those which exist under the
current statutes. Under this section the lender may repossess with-
out judicial assistance if he can do so peaceably, but if consumer
goods are involved and if the debtor has paid more than sixty per
cent of the secured obligation, then the lender must give at least
twenty days notice of his intention to repossess. As under the Con-
ditional Sales Act," the lender may keep the collateral in satisfaction
of his interest by notifying the debtor that he intends to do so and if
the debtor does not object within twenty days.
57
In its establishment of procedure for sale by the lender of the
repossessed collateral, the Code takes a middle path between the cum-
bersome and expensive restrictions of the Conditional Sales Act and
the utter freedom of action given the lender in a bailment lease trans-
52. Reinhart v. Gerhardt, 152 Pa. Super. 229, 31 A.2d 737 (1943) ; National Cash
Register Co. v. Ansell, 125 Pa. Super. 309, 189 Att. 738 (1937).
53. The exemption statutes appear in PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, §§ 2169-2180 (Pur-
don, 1931; Cum. Supp. 1948).
54. 57 Pa. D. & C. 577 (C.P. Erie 1948).
55. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 2178 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
56. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 458 (Purdon, 1931).
57. § 8-505.
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action. Under the Code the sale may be either public or private. All that
is required is that it be conducted in a "commercially reasonable man-
ner" 58 and that "reasonable" notice be given to interested parties.
This is in sharp contrast to the Conditional Sales Act, which requires
a public sale within thirty days if the debtor has paid at least fifty
per cent of the purchase price, the posting of three notices of sale in
the filing district and advertising if the debtor has paid more than
$500."9 Private sales are now permitted, however, when the security
device employed is a chattel mortgage 60 or trust receipt.6 Strangely,
the Factor's Lien Act makes no provision at all for either repossession
or sale on default.
The code also provides that, unless the debtor has renounced his
right of redemption or the lender has given notice of his intention
to keep the collateral, the debtor may reclaim the goods at any time
before a contract of sale has been executed by tendering expenses
and all sums due under the defaulted agreement. 2 This redemption
provision is similar to that in the chattel mortgage statute.63 How-
ever, under the Conditional Sales Act, a vendee who has not been given
notice of the lender's intention to repossess may redeem the collateral
in ten days by paying merely the expenses of repossession and the
amount due under the contract at the time of repossession. 4
A new provision is Code Section 8-502, which gives to the
assignee of accounts receivable or chattel paper the right to complete
control of the assigned accounts when the assignor is in default. But
if the assignment was "with recourse," the assignee must proceed in
a commercially reasonable manner.
CONCLUSION
No attempt has been made in this paper to touch upon every
aspect of the Code as it deals with secured transactions, nor does the
discussion purport to note every change which would be effected by
the Code in the Pennsylvania law of chattel security. An attempt has
been made, however, to note those Code provisions which should prove
to be of greatest significance to Pennsylvania businessmen and law-
yers. Should the Code be adopted by the General Assembly, future
events will undoubtedly disclose problems which were not anticipated
here or by the Code's draftsmen. But it is apparent from a study of
58. § 8-507.
59. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 455 (Purdon, 1931).
60. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.14 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
61. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 556 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
62. § 8-506.
63. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, §940.14(c) (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1948).
64. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§ 452, 453 (Purdon, 1931).
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the Code that its draftsmanship is superbly clear and precise; insofar
as precision of language can bring certainty to the rules governing
chattel security, the Code will do just that. The improvement it
promises over Pennsylvania's current array of chattel security statutes
is much more, however, than precision of draftsmanship. The rules
it lays down are well calculated to meet every legitimate need of the
business community. For the most part, they are modeled after con-
cepts that have already been proved and tested in the laboratory of
commercial experience. Those provisions which are new seem to
follow from those which have been proved and tested. And for the
first time, these rules have been assembled into an integrated statute
that will permit courts as well as lawyers to base their judgments upon
facts instead of form.
